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DUFRENNE AND THE VIRTUAL
as an Aesthetic Category in Phenomenology
Introduction
In the last five to ten years technological progress has
fostered the increasing use ofthe term virtual. Especially in the field
of computer technology certain interfaces have been developed which
are to be subsumed under the notion virtual reality . These interfaces,
engineered to enhance the interaction between man and computing
machine, are to be characterized as a frameless simulation of a
universal environment, which may even lead to the construction of
sensual input oftactility. We will return to this definition later.
However, the notion of the virtual, as we want to
demonstrate, may serve as an aesthetic category, which originates in
a particular Ausarbeitung of phenomenology. As such, it can be
applied in analyses by present aesthetic theory. The starting point is a
close look at i~quiries into aesthetics in relation to new media (art
which is generated by means of or with the help of computers and
video, thereby engendering works of art which cannot be accounted
for in traditional ways). As a result, a certain the·oretical
inhomogeneity of these inquiries becomes manifest. Various models
of explanation like e.g. constructivism 1 are employed in a dispersed,
pluralistic manner, and lack precise or rigorous examination of the
field of inquiry. Consequently, no generally acknowledged
terminology or conceptualisation has been developed and applied.
Starting from the smallest, nuclear units and continuing upwards in
scale until the comprehensive, general phenomenon is reached, the
aesthetic field is simultaneously underdetermined, as obvious gaps in
its description (for instance perceptual constitution) seem to indicate,
1 (cf. Florian Rötzer (1993), Images Within Images, or, "From the Image to the
Virtual World," in: Timothy Druckrey (ed.), Iterations:'The New Image, Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press 1993, pp.6177)
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and overdetennined, as the multitude of competing models of
explanation indicates. The collection of essays Electronic Culture2
from 1996 can be taken as an illustration ofthis pluralistic approach
(plural in its pejorative sense). Either the realm of new media is
regarded as a continuation of traditional forms of art by new means,
that is, an approach in which the traditional categories are arduously
adapted to these expansions of art, or a new conceptual system is
brought into being, so the novel phenomena can be described
described in a precise manner, even in a new vocabulary3. The danger
that lies in the first approach is a possible lack of flexibility of .its
concepts, which eventually will limit its conception of new
phenomena; the danger of the latter consists in the lack of an
underlying, supporting conceptual system to simultaneously constrain
and organise the production of new notions.
In this quandary, we will try to present the development of a
different perspective which may offer a solution intended to unify the
two approaches. In terms of the category of the virtual, which is not
widely used by phenomenological aesthetics, phenomenology may
offer a possible way to answer both demands: the demand for
conceptual rigour and the demand for adaptibility to new
constellations and facts. In order to give an account of this concept
we are going to give a short summary of phenomenological
aesthetics, its main representatives and its main concepts. Mikel
Dufrenne's never tiring efforts in phenomenological aesthetics will be
outlined; furthennore we will try to explain how the notion of the
virtual, especially in the definition given by Dufrenne, can be applied
to aesthetics in new media; an example of art in this new media will
illustrate how the virtual can contribute to aesthetics as an efficient
category. Finally a short discussion will present some ideas of the
chances and possibilites of an aesthetics supplemented with
phenomenological rigor and phenomenological categories.
Phenomenological Aesthetics
2 (Timothy Druckrey (ed.), Electronic Culture, New York: Aperture 1996)
3 (cf. Villem Flusser, Jean Baudrillard)
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--------------------------------~-------------- -
Where phenomenology, if at all, deals with art phenomena it
deviates from traditional aesthetics which sometimes still uses
Kantian categories. The primacy of perception in phenomenology
hints at a preference of sensuality as aisthesis. Hence it may be
worthwile to take a look at phenomenological positions in regard to
aesthetics.
Generally it can be said that phenomeno,logy has laid
emphasis on various aspects of arte A few of its attempts lead to quite
independent art theories, such as the aesthetics of reception following
Roman Ingarden s analyses of literary works of arte Starting points in
Husserl s writings with regard to the project ~f a phenomenological
aesthetics are, among others, the theory of the image, the role of
phantasy, and the neutralisation ofthe relation to reality.
To give an impression of what phenomenological aesthetics
is about, and to render a survey of the notions and concepts engaged,
we will present in a short outline its main representatives and their
ideas. The historical beginnings of a phenomenological aesthetics
which Husserl did not explicitly elaborate in his work are sketched
with a few names: Moritz Geiger4 expands Husserl s focus on the
object as such to aesthetics by the concepts of empathy (Einfiihlung)
and aesthetic enjoyment, which he mainly derives from enlpirical
psychology. Fritz 5emphasises, in a way similar to Heidegger, the
artistic being-in-the-mood (Gestimmt
Sein) and the relation of art to religion and metaphysics.
Oskar Becker6 gives an account of the work of art as a
hyperontological phenomenon, which cannot be considered simply a
past fact, but remains· beyond history. Yet these approaches are far
from being systematic or complete, which perhaps is the reason for
not having engendered further discussion. In comparison, Roman
Ingarden7 is an exception, as he triggers the development of the
above-mentioned aesthetics of reception,. which elaborated his theory
4 (Die Bedeutung der Kunst, 1916)
5 Kaufmann (Das Reich des Schönen, 1960)
6 (Dasein und Dawesen, 1963)
7 (The Literary Work ofArt, 1931)
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ofthe interpretatory gap to an impressive theory ofthe processes in a
reader's consciousness. As a matter of fact, Martin Heidegger has to
be mentioned in this context, since he began his work as an assistent
of Husserl in the phenomenological tradition. His contribution to
aesthetics in general, as original and substantial as it may be (above
all, his analyses of the work of art and of language as Dichtung), does
not share many of the conventional features of phenomenological
inquiry (focus on intentionality, on acts of consciousness, and so on),
so it can be skipped here.
With regard to the phenonlenological tradition in France,
where the question of aesthetics fell on more fruitful grounds in terms
of interest and elaboration, one has to mention Jean
Paul Sartre's concept of imagination. In his work imagination
is not, as in Husserls theory, only a modification of the primordial
Urmodus (arch-mode) of perception, but has apower of its own,
which results in the de-realisation, the neantisation of the real world.
At the same time imagination is one of the forms which render
possible a process of consciousness between subject and object.
Sartre distinguishes this imagining consciousness from the realizing
consciousness of perception. According to Sartre, the latter has
infinitely rich nuances, whereas the former is determined by an
impoverished state. The work of art, for Sartre, is transformed into an
irreal thing, i.e. it appears only as aesthetic object, and only under the
conditio~ that the spectator's consciousness changes into an
imagining consciousness. What we conceive as the work of art, as the
real object in space-time, or as the real perceived musical
performance, is for Sartre only the real analogon for the irreal object
of consciousness, the aesthetic object. The material quality of the
work of art is the agent evoking the aesthetic object. Sartre has to be
praised for having introduced sensuality into the discussion of
aesthetic experience.
The other great figure in French phenomenology is, of
course, Maurice Merleau
Ponty. His fundamental contributions to the
phenomenological movement, or rather to the idea it represents, are
manifold. We only will recall the most important ones which treat
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problems of the aesthetic field. The first thing that has to be
nlentioned, when Merleau-Ponty's view on painting is considered, is
the emphasis on a lived perspective, on the relation between the
living body and the visible world. In this way, he abandons the
univocal, planimetrie perspective. In the works of painters he tries to
extract meaning which refers to qualities that seem rather alien to
painting, such as the gesturing and speaking of the subject. In the
same attempt Merleau-Ponty points out the primacy of solidity and
constancy over secondary qualities like color and tangibility in a
context of the subject's life itself. It is the fusion of the self and the
world which, according to Merleau-Ponty, takes place in artistic
creation, and not an imitation or subjective projection of the artist s
imagination. Moreover, this approach allows for the
overdetennination and abundance of meaning in an artwork. The
notion of style as a system of equivalences an artist creates in order to
grapple with the visible world (the coherent deformation by which
he concentrates the still scattered meaning of his perception and
brings about its explicit existence8,
and the intertwining of the visible with the invisible mark
the subsequent drifting towards questions of ontology. This
orientation towards ontological problems is a tendency he shares with
the french philosopher Mikel Dufrenne, who has to be praised as the
main contributor to the project of a phenomenological aesthetics.
Mikel Dufrenne
Mikel Dufrenne's Phenomenologie de l'experience esthetique
(1953)9, is a systematic and comprehensive attempt to penetrate the
processes and layers in experiencing aesthetic phenomena of all
kinds. In later years he dedicated a great part of his studies to
aesthetic questions, such as Le Poetique (1963) in the following
decade. Between the 1967 and 1981 aseries of essays with the title
Esthetique et philosophie was published in three volumes. 1987 the
8 Maurice-Merleau Ponty, Signs, Evanston: Norhtwestern
University Press 1964, pp. 54f.
9 The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, Altantic
Highlands: Humanities Press 1987, p. 5.
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book L' oeil et I oreille (The Eye and the Ear) treated questions of the
sensuous and focused on the mutual relation among the senses with
regard to lived aesthetic experience.
Moreover we would like to draw attention to the fact that in
the German speaking world Dufrenne is not as widely known as in
England and North America. Until today not one single translation of
his books into German has been published. Due to this fact Dufrenne
is not widely studied among phenomenological thinkers in Austria,
Switzerland and Germany.
In order to give an overall impression, we will sketch the
main concepts of the Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. In
this book, Dufrenne aims at the correlativity of aesthetic object and
aesthetic experience, which can be described only in their mutual
relations. Since aesthetic experience takes place in a subject, more
precisely in a spectator-subject, Dufrenne stresses the aspect of the
recipient and not that of the producer of arte The aesthetic object is
the work of art accomplished by aesthetic perception. The sensuous is
the key concept for the aesthetic object, since here one does not deal
with an object's raw, expressionless sensuousness (of
sense-constituents), but with a sensuous which is instrumental in the
structure of the aesthetic object. The sensuous is the common act of
the sensing and the sensed10•
Furthermore, the meaning of the aesthetic object is given as
a whole in the sensuous and does not refer to something that ·1ies
outside the object as with action or knowledge. This meaning
organizes the aesthetic object within the limits of spatio-temporal
patterns. By means of potential internal relations a world is
expressed, which, according to Dufrenne, qualifies the aesthetic
object as a quasi-subject. The inexhaustible abundance of the
aesthetic object in its multitude of actual and potential relations
within itself and with the spectator justify speaking of a world as weIl
as giving it the status of a quasi-subject .
This world within the aesthetic object has an expressivity of
its own, since it is capable of rendering expression. This feature, one
10 Mikel Eufrenne, In the Presence of the Sensuous,
Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press 1987, p.S.
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ofDufrenne s most original contributions11
is based on affective qualities which enhance the status of
the quasi-subjective and make it possible to establish a typology of
aesthetic objects. For the function of the affective quality, like the
meaning of which it is the expressive counterpart, is precisely to
organize the sensuous12.
On the subject's side, Dufrenne introduces feeling
(sentiment), which enables the communion of subject and object in
ae,~thetic experience. Feeling operates as transcendental organ of the
recipient, dealing with the expressivity of the work of art and locating
it in his or her presence. This interplay of aesthetic object and
perceiving subject in aesthetic experience also has a transcendental
dimension: the affective quality of the aesthetic object even
constitutes the expressed world and can thus be looked upon as
cosmological a apriori. In the perceiving subject as weIl certain
affective categories can be identified, e.g. the sublime, tragic, the
just, which we know apriori, and which Dufrenne calls existential a
priori . In this transcendental context, the term virtual emerges for
the first time: the existential apriori is a knowledge apriori, it has
been always already possessed, thus it is virtual in the sense of being
a possibility, a knowledge that has not yet been actualized. In his late
work Husserl stressed the importance of habitus and sedimentation
for his general concept of the life-world. Both of these terms are
comparable with Dufrenne s virtual knowledge, to the extent that
they are able to presuppose arealm of habits or achievements in
consciousness which is not directly accessible by the latter's
activities. Dufrenne remarked on this in The Notion of the APriori:
Now, the only difference between the apriori, understood as a
virtuality and as ahabit, is that virtuality is a nonacquired habit, even
if it comes to light only through experience. Virtuality is the ground
from which habits arise; it determines the facility and rapidity of their
execution13.
11 Edward S. Casey, Forword, in: Phenomenology of
Aesthetic Experience, p.xxvii.
12 Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, p.xxxiii.
13 Mikel Dufrenne, The Notion of the APriori, Evanston:
Northwestern University Press 1966, pp. 155f.
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This work is an attempt to liberate the concept of the apriori
from the restrictions of Kant and to apply it in his position of a
post-critical naturalism14.
As far as the meaning and function of the virtual and of
virtuality are concerned, Dufrenne characterizes them as a not yet
actualized knowledge, a possibility on the side of the subject in
opposition to a possibility on the side of the real and of nature: For
we must not confuse the virtual with the possible here. In the subject,
the virtual already exists, even if it is not actualized or made explicit.
The opportunity to be made explicit as knowledge is proposed by
the world, since the subjective apriori is nothing more than the
comprehension of the objective apriori: the subjective apriori
remains virtual because the objective apriori remains possiblel5 •
At this point in our account of Dufrenne's aesthetics, it might
be useful to stop and turn to a short lexical outline of the term
"virtual," which is used in different contexts. "Virtual" derives from
the Latin "virtus," meaning strength or virtue. Its literal translation is
"in possession of certain physical virtues." Its customary use would
be as being such in essence or effect though not formally recognized
or admitted, or, in physics, of, relating to, or being a hypothetical
particle whose existence is inferred from indirect evidence , e.g.
. 1 h 16vlrtua p otons .
(moreover, the theory of science in a Bachelardian way, an
epistemologie, may certainly contribute to the notion of the virtual, if
Bachelard s emphasis on indirect inference is considered; according
to hirn, apparatuses and experimental devices of natural science
already represent filters or media which permit only indirect or
mediated evidence); in the 19th century, with the developing science
of optics, the virtual image is described as an image (as seen in a
14 Edward S. Casey, Translator 's Introduction, in The
Nation of the APriori, p.xxiv.
1~ Mikel Dufrenne, The Notion of the APriori, p. 202.
16 Moreover, the theory of science in a Bachelardian way,
an epistemologie, may certinly contribute to the notion of the
virtual, if Bachelard's emphasis on indirect inference is
considered. According to Bachard" apparatuses and experimental
devices of natural science already represent filters or media
which permit only indirect or mediated evidence.
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plane mirror) fonned ofpoints from which divergent rays (as oflight)
seem to emanate without actually doing so ; and about at the end of
last decade, the term virtual reality accounts for an artificial
environment which is experienced through sensory stimuli (as sights
and sounds) provided by a computer and in which one s actions
partially detennine what happens in the environment . In optics, the
optical image is defined as the apparent reproduction of an object,
formed by a lens or mirror system from reflected, refracted, or
diffracted light waves. There are two kinds of images, real and
virtual. In a real image the light rays actually are brought to a focus at
the image position, and the real image may be made' visible 'on a
screen. This is impossible for a virtual image, since it is constituted
by rays that do not come from where the image seems to be; e.g., the
virtual image in a plane mirror is at some distance behind the mirror.
It can also be formed inside an instrument like a microscope or
telescope at the point where diverging rays would cross if they were
extended backward into the instrument. Thus in the traditional notion
of the virtual two genuine meanings can be identified: one relating to
the possible and the other relating to a certain mode. ofvisibility. This
historical determination of the term virtual already offers some
points of departure for a use in an aesthetic theory, e.g. the
connotation with visibility or the connotation with appearance, which
connects it to traditional aesthetic questions ( schöner Schein ).
Virtuality in Dufrenne and in Aesthetics
Dufrenne uses virtuality or the virtual not only in the sense
and context presented above; his return to the term demonstrates his
fascination with
In L'oeil et 1'0reille17 Dufrenne inquires into the interplay and
interdependence of different sensorial registers. It is the virtual which
forms the main subject in the concluding chapter. This chapter begins
with the already known definition of the virtual as an immanent
imaginary: the virtual is not to be applied iftwo senses are stimulated
17 (Hexagon 1987)
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simultaneously (which is a simple synesthesia). It is only employed if
the stimulus in one sense is accompanied by a certain image of
another stimulus in a different sense, e.g. the music of a painting
which is not a musical object. The virtual is located in the body of the
subject, where the experience of the world is gathered: My hand has
already feIt the velvet quality of this fabric, and did not forget it, as
my mouth did not forget the sugar-taste of the raisin whose golden
transparence my eye has grasped18• Dufrenne calls it an imaginary
immanent in perception: the velvet quality is not present, as if
invoked, but it is not absent as if never known, either it is virtually
here. Imagination is seductive, says Dufrenne, for it can carry away
one s images in an aesthetic experience, hence his claim to suppress
imagination during aesthetic perception. The imaginary has to be
distinguished from the imagined: the imaginary is not feIt, not given
as embodied, it is pre-sensed in the shadow of the sensed19 it is an
imaginable, which is a different way to signify the virtual. This
notion of the virtual recalls Dufrenne s earlier thoughts; above we
saw that the virtual is the subjective counterpart to the possible in the
realm of the real. The imaginable precedes the real, and the
imaginary as the virtual can be defined as a function either of the
subject or the object, either as immanent imaginary or as the
non-perceived which impregnates the real as the possibility of
perception: the non-visible which adheres to the visible and renders
it a new dimension. The visible teIls of this invisible: the gold of the
raisin teIls of its sugar as the transparence of the crystal teIls of its
sound20• The virtual seems to appear in the object, it haunts the object
and adds being and sen~e to it. Dufrenne even refers to
Merleau-Ponty when the says that it urges us to think the object as
flesh21 The virtual, again in its definition as apriori, is the potential
in the object; in the subject it is a possibility to anticipate experience.
Thus the virtual can be understood as a mediating instance between






[essential in explaining the structures of aesthetic experience22•
Dufrenne defines imagination by its receptivity, as recipient, not as
producer of the imaginary: hence the imaginary is part of the world.
The imaginary can remain impersonal, latent, in a pre-actualized
state: The imaginable ocean, which lends its title to the musical
work, is evidently not visible in listening to the symphonie poem; but
it must not be imaginarised, either, must not tilt in a subjective
imaginary, where manifold images can contribute to a singular
mediterranean23 • In the concluding· paragraphs Dufrenne determines
the virtual as trans-sensuous in order to designate a certain pre-sensed
in aesthetic experience: This virtual were latent due to lack of its
power to inscribe itself in a detennined register, because it reaches
across several ofthem: transsensuous since multisensuous, one would
dare to say, but also multisensuous since presensuous. (Loc.cit.,
p.199)
Summarizing the definitions of the virtual, we can distinguish
three types or connotations of the virtual: first, the virtual as apriori
knowiedge in the subject, structuring affective qualities and
dispositions. Second, the virtual in its function as imaginable as
internlediate between object and subject, situated in the shadow of
the sensuous, and apriori to any given image, the trans- or
pre-sensuous . And third, the virtual as a particular species of image,
derived from .its application in optics, from the field of the visual;
though it is probably suitable to describe this species of images in
other senses, too it should be possible to generalize the image and
detaeh it from vision24.
However, the question is: which distinctions can be made
with regards to a virtual image? A juxtaposition of all those meanings
of the virtual would certainly serve weIl to describe its precarious
Ioeation. Contrary to the genuine image, a virtual image is not located
in the realm or region where images are constituted or perceived, it is
displaced, shifted, like a phantom which is haunting imagination and
22 (Loc.cit., p.196)
23 (Loc.cit., p.198)
24 (here we have to think of Saussures definition ofthe signifier as an acoustic
image, which already is subjective, yet, of course, not visual)
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even perception. It is somewhere else, in an impossible position on
the verge of being imagined, on the verge of the imaginable, effecting
the imaginable, but not being perceived itself.
Virtuality, then, could be applied to phenomena, especially
aesthetic objects, which affect more than one imaginary or sensual
register, but without subdueing to simple synesthetic combinations,
e.g. in situations when we talk about the sound of a color without
actually imagining asound at the sight ofthe color.
What is not actually perceived, yet on the verge of being
perceived, adds to an aesthetic object a new meaning ( increase of of
being and sense25,. It co-constitutes its depth and expressivity. It is
this virtual that adds to the overall effect of the work of art, but
without actually being taken into account mentally or perceptively, as
something that causes anticipations of future images.
Gf course one has to ask about the necessity of the
introduction of the term virtual into a theoreticalframework, since
there are several terms with similar meaning which philosophy has
been using for a long time: What might be the difference to possible
, real, irreal, latent, apparent, as if (in Husserls phenomenology
the difference between reell and irreeell could might complete that
list)? Obviously, the main connection of virtual to these terms is the
relation to a certain visibility, in addition to a weakened or changed
mode of reality (though Dufrenne uses this more optical meaning in
his later writings). Moreover, the aspect of inherence, of
unrecognized being contained has to be mentioned, which, according
to Dufrenne26, in Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience and The
Notion ofthe APriori holds a decisive position, and can be compared
with the concept of latency in psychoanalysis.
Art in the New Media
What are the characteristics of art in the new media such as
video, computer graphics and image processing, and computer-aided
25 Loc.cit., p.196)
26 Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience and The Notion of the APriori
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art forms in general? From the point of view of the constition of an
aesthetic experience, the mechanised interactivity has to be observed
(the happenings and the actionism of the 60s might be called the
predecessors to this feature; hence much of what can be said on
interactivity is also valid for these art forms). Furthermore there is the
immersive quality of surrounding environments; the digital
processing of images; the self-referential and self-modifying forms of
generative patterns; and new forms of collective participation and
collaboration in the creation of the work of art27•
The virtual, however, can account for two of these
dimensions: interactivity, and immersion, as these dimensions are
linked to the field of phenomenology. New artistic devices and
methods are more efficiently explained and conceived by other
approaches, e.g. by sociology or psychology of creativity. If perhaps
the phenomenological inquiry into the aesthetics of new media will
have developed further, it will be possible to grapple with the
above-mentioned feature of collectivity, since intersubjectivity was
an is a main issue in phenomenology.
Interactivity, which can be seen as a terminological
suggestion for an answering aesthetic object, complicates this object
s constitution: not only has the spectator-subject to respond to the
expressivity of the aesthetic object, she also engenders new strata of
meaning within it, adds new dimensions of expression by virtue of
her own reactions. She thus deepens and affirms the status of the
aesthetic object as a quasi-subject. In the case of interactive contexts
virtuality will be applied to analyse and explain the emergence of
unforeseen dispositions in an interactive dialogue with the work of
arte We n1ight say that the dialogue produces an image which remains
virtual, since it is not foreseeable and exceeds any anticipations.
There is also a refe~ence to the imaginable, as a sensed or even only
pre-sensed potential that comes into being through mutual
constitutional processes as the interaction continues (very much in
the same way as the quasi-subject is engendered, but on an even more
personalised level).
27 (for the latter cf. Pierre Levy, "The Art ofCyberspace ," in: Timothy Druckrey
(ed.), Electronic Culture, Aperture 1996)
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Immersive environments, as a second trait of art in the new
media, are another art form the notion of the virtual can deal with. An
immersive work of art surrounds the spectator on all sides by its
sensorial input; its technological implementations can be flight
simulators for airplane pilots or virtual reality arcade games. The
simultaneous substitution of several sensorial registers creates a
distinct kind of virtual image there is not need for a reduction such
as in any performative art (in theatre, the spectator has to
parenthesize the fact that he sits in the auditory). This impossibility
of keeping one s distanc~ gives rise to particular sensations.
However, if this immersive environment interacts with the immerged
subject in terms of tactile feedback or simulated motions, another
layer of sensory perception is provided contributing to aesthetic
experience though presently it is difficult to imagine a full-fledged
work of art ofthis kind. Nevertheless, at this point the virtual consists
of the enclosing image as weIl as of the trans-sensuous quality feIt or
better pre-sensed in this environment. Presumably this pre-sensuous
may function as well as a sort of reality-sign (to make it possible, as
in early psychonanalysis, to distinguish the real from the imaginary),
because the virtual extends across aB senses without being involved
in any, and thus impartially accounts for a grasp of reality.
Examples for Virtuality
To illustrate the competence of the category of the virtual in
explaining aesthetic experiences in the art of the new media, an
application to two exemplary works of art will be sketched. These
works of art are deliberately chosen simple, so the general idea can
be more easily conveyed.
The first one is VIDEOPLACE, an interactive media
installation from 1975 by the pioneering computer and video artist
Myron Krueger. VIDEOPLACE was an installation with video
equipment, basically set up to interweave video input with graphical
editing and participant s responses to their fed
back images. Krueger had noticed [...] that people identified
themselves very strongly, almost physically, with their video images,
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even in the form of silhouettes. In an early experiment, when Krueger
and an assistant at a remote location were using video silhouettes of
their own hands to point at objects in a shared video space, he
accidentally moved his hand s video image so that it intersected with
the video image of his assistant s hand. The assistant moved his hand
away, as if he had been touched. In a visceral way, mixing people s
video images'together in a way that was visible to them created a new
kind of communication space, complete with a sensitivity to the
boundaries of one s virtual body28. Moreover, the instance of actual
touch is a test in implementing virtual reality reconstructing in an
image the sensation of touching and being touched ranks among the
most difficult tasks in VR
engineering. This example makes it' quite obvious how the
virtual affects bodily sensations by projection and identification: the
persons taking part at the video installation produced virtual images
of their bodies, and reacted upon what virtually happened to these
images. The perceived margins of their physical bodies overlapped or
fused with the sensations given by the work of art, thereby opening
new dimensions in self-perception and participating in a process of
discovering new possibilities of movement and interaction.
The other example is a more recent work: in 1993 Joachim
Sauter has developed a provocative interactive experiment concept,
with the title The Un-Seer (Der Zerseher) , in which the
unconsciously and arbitrarily executed movements of the eye are
linked, on a visual level, to changes in the image and thus the
position of an extemal observer is systematically destroyed. Using an
eye-tracking system, eye movements are linked to the image such a
way that each movement destroys the part of the image viewed. What
remains is a color painting of motions executed by the eye. Here, the
observer is captured inside the image; he or she interferes with the
image while creating a new image29.' By ce>rrelating the unconscious
bodily movements of vision with effacing the actual seen image, a
virtual, pre-sensuous, as it were, connection is made between
customary acts of seeing and the image of e.g. consummation; here,
28 (Howard Rheingold, Virtual Reality, New York: Summit Books 1991, p.122)
29 (Florian Rötzer, loc.cit., p.75)
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the German idiom mit den Augen verschlingen (to swallow up with
the eyes) takes on a new meaning, as does the aesthetic object in the
process of constituting and simultaneously de-constituting, of
building up and destroying at the same instance. Virtuality in this
case is applied with regard to the uncommunicable, only imaginable
yet not imagined decay of visibility. The impossibility of a
decomposing visibility is performed by the virtual, for it cannot be
rendered visible in the domain of visibility itself we would only see
a painting painted over with incoherent strokes.
Dutlook
These two examples represent of course only very
rudimentary analyses. Yet we hope that they give an impression what
the category of the virtual can contribute to aesthetics and especially
the aesthetic theory of the New Media. Its elaboration by Dufrenne
with its twofold emphasis on imagination and on potentialities of
various kinds reassured us of the suitability of the phenomenological
method even for describing present art forms; this first glimpse
allows, however, to conclude that introducing the virtual into
aesthetic theory in phenomenological contexts prevents from an
unreflected and rash use of virtuality, and that it explains some
phenomena and circumstances especially in the art of new media. If
we want to continue our inquiries in the outlined way, we could, for
instance,' aim at a phenomenologically complete description of all
phenomena encountered in a virtual reality-environment. A next step
would be to reduce the description to those specific aesthetic
qualities which are engendered by the particular art form (as certain
stimuli are characteristic of dance, of theater, of music). Above all,
the complete sensorial immersion into an environment without any
need for reduction has to be studied with great care, since this feature
is characteristic of the new art form produced by using the techniques
of virtual reality. The elaboration and development of these
approaches will be a promising task for future research in the
aesthetics ofNew Media.
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